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NOTES
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMIsE-DEFENSES.-A most unique set
of facts is presented in the recent case of Longmuir v. Askbey. 1 The
plaintiff gave birth to an illegitimate child as the result of a felonious
assault made upon her without her consent, the perpetrator of the
assault subsequently being convicted for the crime. The unmarried
girl brought an action for breach of promise to marry and seduction
under promise of marriage. The defendant had had intercourse with
the plaintiff a few days before the date set for the marriage. Among
other defenses to the action, the defendant interposed the defense of
unchastity of the plaintiff as an excuse for breaching his promise to
marry her. The New Jersey court, by a majority vote, affirmed the
1

172 AtI. 372 (N. J. 1934).
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decision of the lower court and held that the felonious assault upon
the plaintiff resulting in the birth of a girl child, did not render her
"unchaste" so as to be unable to maintain against another an action
for breach of promise and seduction.
The facts and conclusions of law reached in the instant case leads
to the inquiry of what constitutes a defense in an action for breach
of promise. The defenses are comparatively few in number, it being
the policy of the law to preserve and protect the relationship set up
between the parties by an agreement between them to enter into a
marriage contract.
Agreements to marry, like all other agreements, are governed by
the principles of contract law. It is an elementary fact that one who
promises to marry another must be capable of making a contract. Infancy, insanity, and consanguinity or affinity, offer grounds for the
setting aside of the promise of marriage. A promise to marry is of
course void where either of the parties is already married to a third
person. 2 Likewise, a contract to marry may be rescinded or released
by mutual agreement and such recission or release is a good defense
to an action for breach of the promise.3 However, a mere consent to
a postponement of the marriage does not show a release.
As a general rule, a defense to an action for breach of promise to
marry cannot be based on the undesirable traits of character, or on
objectionable characteristics or conduct of the plaintiff. The basis for
this rule is set out in the opinion of the Pennsylvania court in Gring
v. Lerck:4 "When a man enters into an engagement of marriage with
a woman he is presumed to have made himself acquainted with her
appearance, her temper, her manner, her character, and other matters
which are obvious to the understanding and which can be ascertained
in the social intercourse which usually accompanies courtship. If he
changes his mind and refuses to marry her for a defect which is open
to observation, and which he might have ascertained before by reasonable care, it is no defense to an action for breach of promise to
marriage." The fact that the plaintiff lacked affection for the defendant,
or that her motives in desiring the marriage were purely mercenary,
does not provide a good defense for the defendant in the action, 5 although if the fraudulent concealment of such facts if known would
have prevented the making of a promise to marry, then the defendant
is relieved from liability thereon. The plaintiff is not .bound to make
known such facts but if she should undertake to do so she is bound
to state material facts truthfully, and is also bound not to suppress
2

3
4
5

Johnson v. Iss, 114 Tenn. 114, 85 S. W. 79, 108 Am. St. Rep. 891 (1905).
Mabin v. Webster, 121 Ind. 430, 28 N. E. 863 (1891).
112 Pa. St. 244, 56 Am. Rep. 314, 26 L. R. A. 432 (1886).
Van Houten v. Morse, 38 N. E. 705 (Mass. 1894).
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facts necessary to an understanding of her history. If she wilfully refrains from telling such facts, she is guilty of fraudulent concealment. 6
Disease or physical disability or incapacity is often resorted to as
a defense in breach of promise suits. It can be successfully interposed as a defense only under certain conditions. If the disease or
disability is of a permanent character, and has been contracted sometime during the date of the promise to marry and the date of the
wedding, without fault on his or her part, the party so afflicted can
refuse to carry out the contract. If the disease or disability is of a
temporary character, the marriage can be postponed until a cure is
effected.7 The beneficial results of such a rule are apparent in many
instances. It lessens the number of offspring who are affflicted with
the diseases, many times loathsome, communicated to them by the
infected spouse. Holding the party to his or her promise to marry
would be dangerous to the life of contracting party in some instances
because of the character of the. disease. The breach is and ought to
be clearly excusable in such cases.8 Over and above the fact that the
decisions along these lines rest in a measure on public policy, the underlying reason for the rule is found in the legal conception of the contract
to marry. A contract to marry is coupled with the implied condition
that both of the parties shall remain in the enjoyment of life and
health, and if the condition of the parties has so changed that the
marriage state would endanger the life or health of either, a breach of
the contract is excusable." However, if the defendant knew, or by exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the disease at the
time he made the promise, then it is ordinarily not a good defense.
If the plaintiff marries another after the defendant's breach of
promise to marry, the question presents itself as to whether the defendant can avail himself of this situation and interpose it as a defense. In the leading case of Fisher v. Barber "o the plaintiff was allowed to relieve the defendant of a tidy sum for substantial damages,
regardless of the fact that she had secured a husband after the defendant's breach of promise to marry her. The Court held that the
great distress and disappointment and resultant humiliation caused
by the defendant's failure to marry the plaintiff, could find no adequate
compensation except in a verdict for substantial damages. An interesting Canadian case 11 asserts a contrary view and supports its contentions on the dubious ground that by marrying another, the plaintiff has benefited by the defendant's breach of promise to marry her.
6 Van Houten v. Morse, op. cit. supra note 5.
Trammell v. Vaughan, 59 S. W. 79, 51 L. R. A. 854 (Mo. 1900).
In re Oldfield's Estate, 156 N. W. 977 (Iowa 1916).
9 Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 690, 47 L. R. A. 581 (1899).
10 62 Tex. Civ. App. 34, 130 S. W. 870 (1910).
11 Pepperos v. LeDue, 11 Dom. L. R. 193, 194 (1895).
7
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As a matter of interest it might be noted that perhaps the plaintiff
would not so "benefit" in all cases. Marriage of the parties, of course,
extinguishes the tight of the plaintiff to bring an action for the breach
of promise. "Marriage of the parties as effectually kills the action as

death."

12

In Roper v. Clay 13 the Missouri court held that it is no defense in
an action for a breach of promise of marriage that the plaintiff had
previously contracted to marry another person. This is especially true
where the defendant continues the engagement after learning of such
previous engagement and its continuance.
There remains but one important defense that the defendant can
interpose in an action for a breach of promise-unchastity of the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Williams v. Fahn,14 states the
correct doctrine thus: ". . . where a man discovers after entering into
a contract for marriage-the rule is the same, of course, the parties
being reversed-that his fiancee is a woman of unchaste and immoral
character, he may, at his election, renounce the contract, and may
plead such fact in justification of his conduct in any court of law and
equity." The principle involved is akin to that upon which the doctrine
of implied warranty rests. The defense would be good if the defendant
had knowledge of the fact that she became unchaste since the making of the promise and prior to the breach. 1 5 The presumed chastity
of a woman is an essential element of a contract for marriage. A man
assumes, at least ordinarily, that the woman he is to marry is chaste,
and if he agrees to marry the woman under that assumption, and afterwards' discovers that she had been unchaste, there is no law that
will bind him to his promise. Such a quality in a prospective wife
is essential to promote the confidence necessary to a happy married
life. For these reasons unchastity of the plaintiff is a good defense
even though the plaintiff has reformed and has become a chaste and
virtuous woman subsequent to the marriage promise.1 6 Of course, if
the defendant knows of the shortcomings of the plaintiff, but regardless of her unchastity entered into a contract for marriage and then
violates it, the plaintiff's unchastity will be no more of a valid defense than if illicit intercourse between the parties after the agreement to marry had been set up to justify the breach of promise. This
latter rule finds its ultimate justification on the principle that no person may take advantage of his own wrong.17
12 Harris v. Tisom, 63 Ga. 629, 36 Am. Rep. 126 (1879), headnote.
13
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15
16
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18 Mo. 383 (1353).
94 N. W. 252, 253 (Iowa 1903).

Garmong v. Henderson, 95 Atl. 409 (Me. 1915).
LaPorte v. Wallace, 89 Ill. App. 517, 524 (1900).
Gerlinger v. Fiank, 145 Pac. 1069 (Ore. 1915).
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The decision favoring the plaintiff in the instant case seems to be
correct from a legal standpoint and as a matter of principle. The assault upon the plaintiff was wholly without her consent, that fact
being firmly established by the conviction of the perpetrator of the
assault. She should not be allowed to suffer for the consequences of an
act not her own although much can be said on the part of the de-.
fendant as is evidenced by the fact that six judges of the New Jersey
court subscribed to the dissenting opinion. She has worked no fraud
upon the defendant by concealment of a material fact or otherwise.
In the eyes of the law and upon the tenets of principle she is a
chaste and virtuous woman, and a decision in her favor is a triumph
of legal justice over emotional thinking.
John J. Locker, Jr.

THIRD PERsoN-FRAuDCONSIDERATION.-The Supreme Court of New York in a recent

CONTRACTS-INDUCEMENT TO BREACH BY
ULENT

case, Budd v. Morning Telegraph,' held, two judges dissenting, that
where the plaintiff entered into a contract with a third party as a
handicapper of race horses, and the defendant induced the plaintiff to
breach this contract and enter into its employment under an agreement whereby the defendant would assume all liability for breach of the
first contract with the third party, that the plaintiff, upon breach of second contract by defendant, would not be precluded from maintaining
an action for breach of contract on the ground that the contract
was based upon a fraudulent breach of the first contract and that the
parties were in pari delicto. At first blush it would seem that such a
holding was in direct contrariety of the weight of authority. However,
after analyzing the situation, it may be seen that such"a ruling is more
conducive to the ends of justice than that of the so-called weight of
authority.
In Hocking Valley R. Co. v. Barbour,2 a New York case, it was
held that a buyer's bond to indemnify the seller against liability for
damages to a third party, to whom the seller had previously contracted
to sell the goods, was unenforceable, having been executed as an inducement to the seller to break his contract with the third party, and therefore was based on illegal consideration and was executed for an illegal
purpose. The theory upon which the court reached this conclusion was
of its being against public policy.
Another leading case that is cited as supporting the illegality of consideration is the case of Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alli1 241 App. Div. 142, 271 N. Y. S. 538 (1934).
2 190 App. Div. 341, 179 N. Y. S. 810 (1920).
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ance,3 -wherein a contract between a newspaper man and a news
agency to furnish news of a zeppelin flight through radio messages
to friends constituted breach of contract of passage on zeppelin, the
owners of which had contracted for the exclusive right to the news
to a third party, and the newspaper man was held not to be entitled
to recover stipulated compensation from news agency. However, this
case does not answer the question as propounded in the principal case.
In the Reiner case the wrongful acts of the newspaper man constituted a tort. By his contract with the news agency, he robbed the
third party of the exclusive right to the news rights of the voyage and
attempted to take for himself the advantage which had been contracted
for by the third party. The court held that it would not lend its aid to
a party who had committed a tort to enable him to recover from another the price agreed to be paid for his wrongful act. "The defense is
allowed not as a protection for the defendant, but as a disability to the
plaintiff."
The case of Rhodes v. Malta Vita Pure Food Co.,4 a Michigan

case, adheres to the rule of refusing to enfore a contract, the consideration of which, was the inducement to breach a former contract, together with an assumption of all liability resulting from such breach.
The Michigan court held that where a company made a secret agreement with an employee of a rival company, whereby he was to abandon his contract of employment, the object being to embarrass the
rival company as a competitor, the transaction was illegal and fraudulent and did not furnish a good consideration for the promise to pay
the employee a salary. This case can be distinguished from the principal case on the ground that it was a dishonest scheme by the two
parties to cause an intentional injury to the third person, or rather
the.original employer. The entire transaction was illegal and fraudulent, even to the point of its actual conception and could not possibly
furnish good consideration.
In Roberts v. Criss 5 the Circuit Court of Appeals of United States,
Second Circuit, held that a contract, the basis of which is the violation
by one of the parties of a contract with a third party will not be
enforced by a court, as between the parties. The case was this: The
plaintiff, with knowledge that the defendant was a member of the
New York Stock Exchange and bound by its rules-and, in other
words, that he had a contractual relation with the exchange to obey
these rules-entered into a contract with the defendant in violation
of these rules. This was a contract to commit a tort and can form
no basis for the recovery in his action. The courts do not aid the
8 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N.E. 561, 83 A. L. R. 23 (1932).
4 149 Mich. 235, 112 N. W. 940 (1907).
5 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1920).
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parties to illegal agreements. If any principle of law is well-settled it
is that a party to an illegal undertaking cannot come into a court
either of law or equity and ask to have his illegal contract carried
out. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio, and in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis.
In the case of Attridge v. Pembroke 6 the rule was laid down that
the court will not aid one basing his cause of action on his illegal act
in breaking his contract with the third party. Quoting from the
language of the court: "The law favors observance of a contract, and
frowns on its breach. Common honesty and sound morality demand
that a party be compelled to live up to his agreement, if honestly and
freely made." The court refuses to enforce a contract against public
policy on the theory that such an agreement is injurious to society in
general, and that the only way to stop making such contracts is to
refuse to enforce them.
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts provides that "A bargain, the making or performance of wfiich involves breach of contract
with a third person, is illegal"; 7 and states that "Since breach of contract is a legal wrong, a bargain that requires for its performance
breach of contract with another, is opposed to public policy." 8 In another section we find the basis for the rule laid down in the Reiner
case: "A bargain to commit a tort or in consideration of the commission of a tort, or to interfere with rights belonging to the public, or in
consideration of interference with such rights is illegal." 9
Thus we see, from reviewing the authorities on the question, that
the principal case is quite contrary to anything that has been decided
upon the question in some time. However, this contrariety is more
apparent than real and can be readily justified.
It is quite obvious that one may breach his contract at most any
time and in any manner he chooses; but, of course, will subject himself to an action for damages for such breach. The mere fact that
these damages are assumed by a third person and incidentally form
a part of the consideration for a second contract of employment by
that third person does not constitute any fraud perpetrated by said
third person. By such an act the third person would subject himself
to a liability to the original employer for an interference with contractual relations, which damages would compensate the original employer for any injury he might have suffered by the third person's in6

235 App. Div. 101, 256 N. Y. S. 257 (1932).

§ 576.
8 Comment to section 576.
9 § 571.
7
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terference. These damages together with the damages realized from
the employee's breach would. completely and adequately remedy any
injury caused the original employer.
It can be seen from reviewing the decisions, considered herein, that
they were based -principally on the so-called "public policy" which
much too often is given, apparently when no good reasoning can be
reached to support the holding in a particular case.
W. A. Stewart, Jr.

CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT or TRADE OR COMPETITION IN TRAEINJUNCTIONS.-Recently the Court of Chancery of New Jersey' refused to enforce an employment contract entered into between the
complainant, a local union, and the defendant, a corporation engaged
in the upholstery business. By the terms of this agreement the defendant had agreed to employ only members of the complainant labor
union and under the terms stipulated in the contract. The defendant's
plant was located at Newark, New Jersey, in what is known as the
'"metropolitan area." The complainant, International Union, maintained locals throughout this district, and by its own affidavits showed
that contracts identical to the one sought to be enforced in this case
had been entered into between the complainant and the majority of
employers engaged in similar businesses in the same business area.
The court held that according to the complainant's own proof this
was a part of an attempt to unionize the industry in that area and to
create a labor monopoly in that industry and vacated the limited
restraint imposed by the order to show cause. Berry, Vce Chancellor,
in commenting on the agreement said: "Such a contract is opposed to
publici policy and is void."
This case presents the view that courts will not sanction the creation
of closed shops when they tend to create a labor monopoly. It also
shows the extent to which the New Jersey courts will allow labor to
go in its attempt to organize and bargain collectively. It is the purpose of this note, first, to briefly point out the advance made by labor
in its struggle for judicial recognition of its right to organize and
bargain collectively, and, secondly, to give some insight into the conflicting views taken by the courts toward the labor provisions in the
National Industrial Recovery Act.
The struggle of labor for recognition by the courts of its -right to
combine and bargain collectively has a long history. The opposition to
1 Upholsterers' C. & L. M. I. Union, etc., v. Essex R. & F. Co., 174 Atl. 20?
(N. J. 1934).
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trade unions has been based on two well-used conceptions of the
courts, the doctrines of criminal conspiracy and of restraint of trade.
Although the former has been universally repudiated by the courts it
was the doctrine followed by the courts in the earlier cases in the
United States. This doctrine, that any combination of laborers was
indictable as a criminal conspiracy, was the early common law conception in England. 2 A glance back at the history of the organized
labor movement in the United States shows that for a time the courts
were constrained to follow this early English common law doctrine.3
However, it is now universally recognized as the rule that workingmen and laborers have the right to organize in unions provided they
are for lawful purposes. 4 The favored weapons against the activities of
trade unions is now the doctrine of restraint of trade. The principle
has been firmly settled that to render a combination illegal, under the
anti-trust laws, it must stifle all other competition by intentionally
or necessarily preventing others from engaging in such business.5
According to judicial determination, labor unions may now be organized for the purpose of securing better conditions of working; 6
employees may organize for the purpose of fixing fewer hours of.
labor, 7 for the establishment of a certain standard of wages8 and to
secure collective bargaining upon their own initiative or that of others. 9
Insofar as labor unions have been affected by federal law, the
Clayton Act of 1914 10 seemingly withdrew them from the operation
of the anti-trust laws by assuming that their normal operations are
legal and that such organizations shall not, in themselves, merely because of their existence and operation, be construed to be unlawful
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. However, this provision of the Clayton Act came to mean little or nothing when tested
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. During,1" where it was declared that there was nothing in the
Clayton Act exempting a labor union or its members from liability
2 The King v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep.
9 (1721).
3 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 28 Am. Dec. 501 (1835).
4 Hitchma- Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 172 Fed. 963 (C. C. N. D. W.
Va. 1909).
6 United States v. American Naval Stores, 172 Fed. 455 (C. C. S. D. Ga.

1909).

6 Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 124 N. E. 97 (N. Y. 1919).
7 Saulsberry v. Coopers International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S. W. 1018,
39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1203 (1911).
8 New Jersey Painting Co. v. Local No. 26, etc., 126 At. 399 (N. J. 1924).
9 International Pocketbook Workers' Union v. Orlove, 148 Ad. 826 (Md.
1930).
10 15 U. S. C. A. § 17.
11 245 U. S. 443, 65 L. ed. 349 (1921).

NOES
when it or they depart from its normal operations and engage
in an actual combination in restraint of trade as defined in the
Sherman Act.12 And it has been well settled since the decision in
the above mentioned case in 1921 that the Sherman Act is intended
to punish alike monopolies existing in both capital and labor whenever interstate trade is thereby directly restrained. 13
Standing in the foreground of this forbidding picture is the National Industrial Recovery Act which, among other things, provides,
in Section 7-A,14 that laborers shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
But the cause of labor, in its struggle for the right to bargain collectively with employers under the National Industrial Recovery Act,
has received several set-backs at the hands of the courts, which deftnitely indicate that some of the courts are viewing the labor provisions of the Act with an eye to the past instead of with the view to
the intent of the Act.
There are many cases which illustrate this point. It is sufficient
here to mention but a few of the more important ones. In a recent
Ohio case, Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Dilliard C. Bowles,15 the court
granted an injunction against a union striking to, create a closed
shop. It held that the plaintiff employer should not be required to
sign an agreement to employ only members of one union. In interpreting Section 7-A, the court held that this section forbids a contract
for, a closed shop, and that the injunction would issue to restrain all
activities of employees in this connection to induce the employer to sign
such a contract. In interpreting Section 5-A of the Act, which ex-*
empts those who sign the codes from the operation of the anti-trust
laws, in connection with Section 7-A, the collective bargaining provision
of the Act, the court said that there was nothing in either section
which would permit the defendant's interpretation of Section 7-A
12 15U. S.C.A.§ 1.
13 Vandell v. United States, 6 Fed. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924).
14 15 U. S. C. A. § 707 (a). The complete text of section 707 (a) is:

"Every Code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or.

issued under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) That the

employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of the employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and (2)
that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition
of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing,
or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; and (3) that the employers
shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other
conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President."..
15 1 FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUsTRY SEavICE § 8051 (Ct. of Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1934).
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thus authorizing a closed shop. The defendant Union contended that
if the majority of the drivers of the plaintiff company chose the Union
to represent them the minority of the employees would, under the National Industrial Recovery Act, be compelled to surrender their representation to the Union and either join it or quit their employment. In
passing on this point, the court said that to permit such a construction
would be violative of Section 7-A. McMahon, J., pointed out that,
by the express language of that section, the representation must be
of their (the employees') own choosing and that no mention was made
in the Act of the majority of the employees controlling the minority.
"Furthermore," said McMahon, J., "such a construction is violative of
Section 5-A which provides in part 'nothing in this act and no regulation thereunder shall prevent an individual from pursuing the vocation of manual labor and selling or trading the products thereof.. .'"
The court then referred to statements of General Johnson and also
from Mr. Donald Richberg to the effect that neither employers nor employees are required, by law, to agree to any particularcontract,wlether proposed as an individual or as a collective agreement, and that they
had interpreted Sections 7-A and 5-A exactly as did the court.
Giving the same interpretation to Section 7-A, as did the Ohio
court, but presenting more clearly the apparent inconsistencies the
court must deal with in construing the provisions of the Act, was the
case of Bayonne Textile Corporation v. American Federation of Silk
17
"Workers,
a New Jersey Chancery case, with Berry, Vice Chancellor,
writing the opinion. In this case the operators of a silk mill sought
to enjoin the American Federation of Silk Workers from its efforts to
unionize the employees of the complainant by circulating information
through the medium of a national strike committee for the purpose
of causing a strike among the employees of the complainant. The
complainant alleged that at the time of the filing of its bill none of its
employees were affiliated with any labor organization. The court held
that inasmuch as the purpose of the strike instigated by the defendant
was to compel the complainant to submit to its attempt to obtain for
the Federation a complete monopoly in the labor market in the industry by compelling all employees who wanted to work to join the
union, and by compelling it to agree not to employ workers in its
factories who did not belong to the union, its object was unlawful. In
granting the injunction restraining the activities of the defendant,
the court pointed out that Section 3-A' 8 of the National Industrial Re16 15 U. S. C. A. § 705, in addition to exempting those who sign the codes
from the operation of the anti-trust laws, provides: "Nothing in this chapter, and
no regulation thereunder, shall prevent an individual from pursuing the vocation
of manual labor and selling or trading the products thereof.. ?I
17 168 Atl. 799 (N. J. 1933).
18

15 U. S. C. A. § 703 (a).
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covery Act, which provides that the codes shall not allow monopolies
or monopolistic practices, applied to employees as well as to employers,
and that Section 7-A, as applicable to this case, meant that employees
might organize for the equitable adjustment of grievances, real or
fancied; but that it did not mean that intermeddlers, such as the defendant, could intervene. The court then cited N.R.A. Bulletin No. 3
(clause 5),19 where it is provided: "The employees' part is . ..to
cooperate with N.R.A. and employers in peaceable adjustment of
differences."
It will be noted that these two cases show an apparent conflict existing between the sections of the Act providing for the suspension of
the anti-trust laws for those who sign the codes (Section 5-A and the
provision that nothing in the Act shall be construed to permit monopolies or monopolistic practices, Section 3-A) as they bear on Section
7-A. They also reveal a very unfavorable attitude of these courts
toward the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively under
the codes.
To the same effect as the two cases last reviewed are two New
Jersey Chancery cases with, Berry, Vice Chancellor, again writing
the opinions. They are, Elkind & Sons v. Retail Clerks' International
P. Ass'n 20 and J.Lichtman & Sons v. Leather Workers' .Industrial
Union.21 From the reading of these cases it would appear that Sections 7-A and 5-A, which have been incorporated into the New Jersey
State Enforcement Act, 22 are to be interpreted to mean that the employer shall not be required to sign any agreement to employ only
union labor because any other interpretation would destroy the rights
of the individual employee under the National Recovery Act.
The conflict existing in the letter of 'the National Industrial Recovery Act between the exemption from the operation of- the anti-trust
laws and the prohibition of monopolies will no doubt present some
difficult questions for the courts to settle. The determination of this
conflict will, no doubt, have a marked effect on the interpretations the
courts are to put on Section 7-A.
In the cases thus far reviewed the view is presented that a strike for
a closed shop is illegal under the National Industrial Recovery Act.
This view is based on the belief of the judges that Section7-A guarantees the liberty of collective bargaining and that the dosed shop
hinders the right of the individual employee to bargain freely as was
intended by the Act. It would seem that the National Labor Rela19

3 FEnEA. TRADE A IzxDusTRY SmvicE § 18044.
169 Atl. 494 (N. J. 1933).
21 169 At. 498 (N. J. 1933).
22 3 FEDERAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY SERVicE § 60214 (enacting Section 7-A);
§ 60204 (enacting Section 5-A); and § 60209 (enacting Section 3-A).
20
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tions Board has given a better and more practical interpretation of
Section 7-A in its decisioii of In the Matter of Houde Engineering
Corporation.23 The Board found, in this case, that the Corporation
had violated Section 7-A in interfering with the right of its employees
to organize and bargain collectively and in refusing to bargain collectively within the meaning of the section because, among other things,
it had negotiated with a certain association after its employees "had,
by a majority vote designated the Union as their exclusive agency."
This decision is to the effect that the choice of the majority may bind
the minority.2 4 This has been called the majority view since it presents
the opinion that if the majority of the employees decide on a certain
representative the minority may be compelled to use the same representative as their agency in bargaining with the employer. It was the
same view taken by the court in Fryns v. Fair Lwon Fur Dressing
Company.2 5 It seems to be the more sensible rule that if the majority
of the employees desire a closed shop Section 7-A requires, rather
than forbids, that they should have the right to completely unionize the
plant.
In this connection it is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals of New York, in 1927, in Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v.
Rifkin,26 held that a labor union could call a strike for the purpose
of inducing an employer to hire only union labor. In contrast with the
principal New Jersey case, Andrews, J., went so far as to say that the
efforts of a labor union to unionize an entire trade or business might
be justified.
The provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act gave to
labor a new ray of hope for the solution of the difficulties that beset
every past attempt at collective bargaining. The practicability of Section 7-A as a means of effecting a working agreement between capital
and labor depends entirely upon the interpretations the courts place
upon that section of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
John H. Logan, Jr.
23
24

U. S. LAw WEEK (Sept. 4, 1934) 11.
In U. S. LAW WEEK (Sept. 4, 1934) 11 the National Labor Relations

Board said: "Under Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
when a person, a committee, or orgizization has been designated by the majority
of the employees in a plant or other appropriate unit for collective bargaining, it
is the right of the representative so designated to be treated by the employer as
the exclusive collective bargaining agency of all the employees in the unit."
25 168 Atl. 862 (N. J. 1933). Bigelow, Vice Chancellor, said: "If the majority
of the employees are members of a particular union, the employer cannot dictate
to them another union. But if they are not organized and are, in fact indifferent
as to how they shall be organized, or if the enterprise is just starting, then the
employer may choose his own union and require all his men to join it."
26 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (N. Y. 1927).
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AUTHENTICATION OF DOCUMENTs-TELEGRAmS.-In a recent case in
the Federal courts, Hartzell v. United States,' the defendant was convicted in the lower court of using- the mails to defraud. The defendant while in London had ventured upon a scheme to obtain money
from people in this country. He established several agents throughout the United States and, through them, represented to many people
in this country that he had found the sole heir to the estate of Francis Drake, the English navigator who died about 1596; that he had
obtained an assignment of the estate; that the British government,
holding the vast amount of property belonging to the estate, had
recognized his claim; but that he needed money for attorney's fees
and other expenses before he could have the property turned over to
him. He promised that for every dollar that was given to him to
meet these expenses he would return at least one thousand dollars
when he obtained the property. On the trial the lower court admitted in evidence certain cablegrams received by persons in this
country and purporting to come from the defendant in London.
These cablegrams appeared on their face to come from London, England, and the defendant's name was at the end of each. They were
delivered to persons with whom other evidence showed the defendant
was dealing, and their contents related to the subject matter of the
defendant's dealings. On appeal the court held that 'there was no error on the part of the lower court in admitting these cablegrams in
evidence. While the originals of the cablegrams were those delivered
to the sending office in London, they were outside of the jurisdiction
of the court and the secondary evidence was admissible. The fact
that the defendant actually sent the cablegrams was held to be sufficiently established by the evidence, even though that evidence was circumstantial.
The first matter to be determined in regard to the admission of
telegrams in evidence is whether the copy sent or the one received is
the original. This will depend more -upon the purpose for which the
telegram is offered in evidence than upon the order of time in which
the two copies came into existence. The document required to satisfy
the best evidence rule is the one actually in issue, regardless of
whether it was made before or after another copy of the same instrument. 2 In Montgomery v. United States a the defendant was
charged with violating the Mann Act. A copy of a telegram obtained
from the receiving telegraph office and purporting to be sent by the
defendant was admitted in evidence. On appeal it was held that the
1

72 Fed. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).

2 WIOxORE oN EvmExcE (2d ed.) § 1232.
8 219 Fed. 162 (C. C. A. Sth, 1915).
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copy of the telegram delivered to the sending office was the original,
the court saying: "The contents of telegrams are proved either by
primary or secondary evidence. Primary evidence is the original telegram itself or the admission of the sender. Secondary evidence of a
telegram may consist of a copy proved to be correct or an oral account "of the contents by one who has seen it and knows its contents.
Before secondary evidence, however, may be received, the absence of
the primary evidence must -be satisfactorily accounted for.
"In the practical application of this rule, for the proof of the contents of telegrams, it must be determined which is the original, the
message sent or the one received. This, as a general rule, is determined by ascertaining whether the contents of the telegram sent or
that of the one received are in issue. In suits between the immediate
parties to telegrams, the telegram received is often the original. In
suits against the telegraph company for damages for failure to send
a telegram correctly or at all, the original would be the telegram sent."
In State v. Cologne 4 the agent of a corporation was prosecuted
for making false and fraudulent representations to a purchaser of stock
as to the dividends being paid by the corporation. The agent claimed
to have made the representations believing they were true. It was
held that copies of certain telegrams received by the defendant in the
regular course from the telegraph company, which the defendant
claimed induced him to believe that the corporation was making
money, were admissible in evidence as the originals. The purpose of
•these telegrams being offered in evidence was not to prove who sent
them, but rather to show that the defendant received them, and based
his opinion as to the financial condition of the corporation on them.
We come now to the main question for consideration, the question
of what is necessary to establish the authenticity of a telegram so
as to make it admissible in evidence. In this connection it may be
stated that the rules of evidence in regard to the necessity of identifying a telegram before it is admissible in evidence do not differ from
those governing the identification of othier documents. 5 A telegram
differs from other documents only in the nature of the instrument and
the type of proof that is usually available for the purpose of establishing its authenticity. It is frequently set forth in decisions that
the authenticity of documents may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 6 This rule, however, is of little value to us.
We must look into the cases to find out just what kind and what
amount of circumstantial evidence is required before the telegram or
document will be admitted in evidence.
4

111 Kan. 332, 206 Pac. 1112 (1922).

5 EVIDENCE, 10 R. C. L. § 354.
6 Hartzell v. United States, op. cit. supra note 1; State v. ElTxon, 208 Ia.
1233, 227 N. W. 166 (1929); State v. Davis, 203 N. C. 13, 164 S. E. 737 (1932)
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There are certain types of circumstantial evidence for the authentication of documents that are well-established. If an instrument bears
evidence on its face that it is more than thirty years old, if it is in
the custody of a public official, if it has an official seal or signatureany of these are sufficient to warrant its admission in evidence.7 We
are not dealing here with any of these established cases. A telegram
is very often neither written nor signed in the handwriting of the
sender. Thus one of the most common methods of authenticating a
document, proof of the handwriting, is not available.
The mere fact that a telegram is signed in -the name of the defendant is not sufficient to inake it admissible in evidence against
him. In Citristain v. State s the defendant was on trial for bigamy.
In order to establish the fact that the defendant's first wife was still
living, the prosecuting attorney sent a telegram to her. He received
a telegram in reply signed, "Mrs. Christain." The lower court admitted this telegram in evidence in behalf of the state. On appeal it
was held that the admission of this evidence was error. The fact
that this telegram was signed, "Mrs. Christain," did not prove that
it was sent by the defendant's wife. In State v. Manos 9 the defendant was charged with being a common gambler. The lower court
admitted in evidence a telegram signed in the name of the defendant
and sent to a Chicago concern, making inquiry as to certain articles
commonly used in gambling. A reply to this telegram, directed to the
defendant, and a receipt from the telegraph company to the defendant
for money deposited in payment of an order were also admitted. The
Supreme Court of Washington held that this evidence was improperly
admitted in view of the fact that there was no evidence that the first
telegram was actually signed by the defendant or was in his handwriting, or that the reply telegram or receipt were received or seen by
him.
In People v. Manganaro10 the defendant was on trial for murder.
The state offered in evidence a will signed in the name of the defendant, and found in a room occupied by the defendant up to the
time of the killing. The New York Court of Appeals, holding that it
was not sufficiently shown that this will was executed by the defendant
to make it admissible against him, stated the law on the question of
authentication of documents as follows: "It is a fundamental rule
that, in general, all private writings must be proved to be genuine before they are admissible in evidence. The genuineness may be proved
by indirect or circumstantial evidence the same as many other facts;
but the circumstantial evidence, in the present case, and as a general
7 Wwo3RE oN EvmmcE (2d ed.) § 2131.
8 174 Ark. 357, 295 S. W. 368 (1927).
9 149 Wash. 60, 270 Pac. 132 (1928).
10 218 N. Y. 9, 112 N. E. 436 (1916).
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rule, must be of such a force and character that the defendant's authorship of the writing can be legitimately deduced from it. It must,
with reasonable and natural certainty and precision, compel the conclusion that the defendant wrote the document, and exclude the conclusion that it was the product of another. It must force or induce
the mind to pass beyond a suspicion or conjecture that the defendant
was the author. Suspicion is not proof, nor conjecture, evidence,
upon which courts can act in determining the rights of parties."
In Lewis v. United States 11 the defendant was on trial for using
the mails to defraud. Testimony of certain telephone conversations
was held properly admitted in evidence even though the witnesses
could not identify the voice of the party to whom they talked. It
was shown that the defendant had written letters to the witnesses
acknowledging previous telephone conversations with them. This fact
with the circumstances surrounding the conversations was held.sufficient to identify the defendant as a party to the conversations. In
Gridley v. United States 12 the defendant was charged with using the
mails to defraud by obtaining money on false representations regarding the .title to real estate. Certain unsigned communications sent
from New York were admitted in evidence. Evidence was introduced
showing that the defendant understood that communications sent by
him were to be unsigned, and that he was located in New York. The
court held that the fact that these communications were unsigned, that
they were sent from New York, and that their subject matter had
reference to the defendant's dealings was sufficient to connect the defendant with them.
After considering these cases it seems that it is not sufficient to
authenticate a telegram for admission in evidence to show that it purports to be sent by the defendant, or that it is signed in the defendant's name. No general rule can be set down as to just what evidence is necessary to connect the defendant with the telegram. The
facts in no two cases are exactly alike, and the evidence available for
authenticating a telegram is necessarily different in different cases.
The things usually considered in determining whether the telegram is
properly identified are the subject matter of the telegram, whether it
was sent from the place where -the defendant was located, and the
signature that it bears even though it cannot be proved that the purported signer actually placed his name on it. As stated in People v.
Manganaro 13 it is necessary to do more 'than raise a suspicion that
the defendant sent the 'telegram. Facts must be proved from which
it can be logically deduced that the defendant was the sender.
John A. Berry.
11 295 Fed. 441 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
12 44 Fed; (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
is Op. cit supra note 10.
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EXECUTORS AND ADmINiSTRATORS-CoLLECTION AND PROTECTION
OF ASSETS

OF THE .EsTATE-DEBTS

MINIsTRATORS.-In
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the recent case of King v. Murray 1 the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the surety of Murray on
the executor's bond of Murray was liable for the indebtedness of the
executor to the testator, though at the time of the appointment of
Murray as executor he had no assets out of which the debt could be
paid. The plaintiff, King, was appointed administrator de bonis non
cum testamento annexo subsequent to the removal of Murray and
therefore brought this action against defendant surety company upon
the executor's bond. This case represents the so-called "Massachusetts
Rule" to the effect that the bond of the executor or administrator
covers debts owing from the representative to his testator irrespective
of his ability to pay the same. The principal case applied the rule
where the inability to pay existed at the time of the appointment of
the personal representative.
In considering the ruling of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, it would seem that the decision rendered, in the case above,
presents too strict a conception of the law applicable and is a proposition which undoubtedly renders a hardship upon the surety which is
unjust. This court in dealing with the question of insolvency absolving
the surety from liability upon the bond of an executor or administrator
brushes this contention aside 'and holds the surety liable regardless
of the ability of the principal to pay at the time of appointmerqt.
This principle which has been upheld by the courts of Massachusetts is rejected by a majority of the states. The court of last resort in2
West Virginia in the case of State v. Citizens Guaranty Trust Co.
said: "When, at the time of appointment, a personal representative
indebted to the estate was insolvent and so continued, without laches
on his part, the debt is to be treated as any other debt, and his official
surety is not liable for any more than could have been enforced at any
time within that period." This case is decidedly contra to the ruling of
the Massachusetts court in the principal case. The West Virginia court
adopts the common sense ruling which insures justice and equity. The
Murray case which states the Massachusetts rule seems to be entirely
too narrow. In the first place the court inferred that no amount of
diligence on the part of the surety to ascertain the solvency of the personal representative would prevail and that the surety company must
in effect gamble upon the financial status of the person it assures.
Secondly, it would seem to follow logically that since the surety is
placed in the'same position as his principal there should be no liability
against the surety when there can be none against his principal. Ver1

190 N. E. 526 (Mass. 1934).

2 84 W. Va. 729 (1919).
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mont 3 and New Jersey, 4 in upholding the majority rule, maintain that
the surety is liable only for that amount which the principal was able
to pay.
It is a universal rule that debts owed by a personal representative
to his testator become discharged by appointment and are chargeable
as assets of the estate in the hands of the executor or administrator.
But this has been termed a "legal fiction" and, speaking of "legal
fictions," the Supreme Court of California declared, in In Re Walker's
Estate, 5 that a debt is assets of the estate only as a legal fiction and
to the extent that justice will prevail but the sureties are not liable
if at the time of appointment and grant of letters the administrator
was insolvent. This ruling was subsequently affirmed by the same court
in the case of Sanchez v. Forster6 with the added proviso that the
surety was liable, upon the bond of the administrator, only for what
the principal was able to pay at the time of appointment.
The case of Sanders v. Dodge 7 definitely aligned the Michigan
Supreme Court with the majority. This case held that the executor or
administrator must be insolvent at the time of appointment and also
at the time of discharge before the surety was discharged from liability
upon the principal's bond. Speaking of legal fictions this court bluntly
declared that "Legal fictions should only be resorted to for the purpose of preventing a failure of justice and when they would result
in an unjust and inequitable judgment they should never be invoked."
In Buckel v. Smith's Administrators 8 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky unequivocally said: "But where he was always insolvent and unable to pay, the liability of his sureties upon their undertaking for
his faithful performance of his duties should not be enlarged by a
mere fiction of the law to such an unreasonable extent as to mulct
them for something that no amount of honesty and no amount of
diligence could guard against." The courts, excepting Massachusetts
and a few other jurisdictions, are uniform in holding that insolvency
of the executor is a bar to recovery against the surety. The only point
on which they differ is when insolvency of the principal must occur
in order to absolve the surety. In the cases cited all of the courts
but Michigan hold that insolvency of the executor or administrator at
the time of his appointment is sufficient to absolve the surety from
liability. Michigan, in the Sanders case, requires the insolvency of the
principal to exist at his appointment and at his discharge as executor
or administrator before the surety is released from liability upon his
Lyon v. Osgood, 7 AtI. 5 (Vt. 1886).
Harker v. Irick, 10 N. J. Eq. 264 (1889).
5 57 Pac. 991 (Cal. 1899).
6 65 Pac. 1077 (Cal. 1901).
7 103 N. W. 597 (Mich. 1905).
8 82 S. E. 1001 (Ky. 1904).
3
4
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bond. In the case of McEwen v. Fletcker 9 the Supreme Court of Iowa,
in maintaining the majority rule, goes a step farther and says that
the insolvency must exist at the time the debt matures. Naturally the
status of the principal financially at his appointment or discharge as
executor or administrator should not be the controlling factor in discharging his surety from liability.
In the case of Costigan v. Krause 10 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upheld their decision in the Buckel case, while adding that the insolvency must exist at the appointment of the principal. In the case
of the The State, ex. rel. McClamrock v. Gregory 11 Indiana firmly
adheres to the rule absolving the surety from liability where the personal representative is insolvent at the time of appointment.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Wacksmuth v. Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 2 aptly expresses the ultimate conclusion logically
reached, after a close study of these cases, when it said: "It seems to
us the rule laid down in Massachusetts is liable to work a great hardship upon administrators and the sureties upon their bonds. To compel
sureties on administrators' bonds to augment the estate of the deceased by requiring them- to pay a debt an insolvent administrator
happens to owe the estate is imposing a burden upon them not contemplated, and in many cases a great hardship."
Albert J. Andreoni.

INSANE PERSONS-ToRTs-SLANDER.-Where a person is so insane as not to understand at all the nature of his act, should he be
held liable in slander for his statements? To answer this interrogatory
unqualifiedly in either the affirmative or the negative is impossible, for
there has been much litigation on this question and there is a marked
contrariety of judicial opinion concerning it. In the first place, there
is a great deal of ambiguity in the term "insanity." An individual adjudged insane by a court may have anyone of a number of mental
diseases, the respective symptoms and manifestations of which are
as divergent as day and night, and yet he is regarded as insane. Mental abnormalities, as the psychiatrists call them, are divided into two
main classes: organic psychosis and functional psychosis, and the only
point of difference between the two being that the causes of the former are known, and those of !the latter are not. These two major
divisions are divided into numerous subdivisions, each of which is
different, and affect individuals differently. For instance, the reactions
9
10
11

146 N. W. 1 (Iowa 1914).
166 S. W. 755 (Ky. 1914).
119 Ind. 503, 22 N. E. 1 (1889).

12 89 N. E. 787, 788 (IR. 1909).
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of one who is the victim of paresis, an organic psychosis, acts differently from one afflicted with paranoia, a functional psychosis; their
mental reactions are different, for one in the advanced stages of paresis
is devoid of reasoning power, while the most rabid paranoiac is wholly
rational except upon one or perhaps several points, yet both individ.
uals would be declared "insane" by the courts. Should not an individual who is rational in regard to all but a few things be held to sa
stricter degree of legal liability than one who is entirely irrational?
The most elementary principles of justice demand that he should.
Perhaps the earliest case dealing with the liability of an insane
person for his torts is Weaver v. Ward,' wherein it was said that "if a
lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass." This, however, was only dictum, but it clearly shows the extent to which those
mentally deranged were liable three centuries ago. Yet before this
2
case was decided, even greater liability was placed on such individuals.
8
Prior to this decision, there was absolute liability for torts; Weaver v.
Ward marked the turning point from this doctrine of absolute liability
to liability for fault.4 Much water has flowed under the bridge since
that decision was rendered, and the tendency of the courts today in
regard to the liability of insane persons for torts, and especially for
slander, is to this effect: "Whether an insane person is or is not liable
in damages for libel or slander depends on whether intent or malice
is an element of the particular libel or slander. If it is, a person is not
liable in damages therefor if, at the time of speaking or publishing the
defamatory words he was totally deranged, or was the victim of in1 Hob. 134, Moore K. B. 864, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616).
2 An accidental defect, such as insanity, did not excuse those who were
under it "from civil actions to have a pecuniary recompense for injuries done,
as trespasses, batteries, woundings; because such a recompense is not by way
of penalty, but a satisfaction done to the party..." 7 HALE, PLEAs OF TH
CRowN (1800) 15.
Bacon, in treating of how far want of understanding will excuse a lunatic,
goes on to say: "And here we must observe a difference the law makes between
civil suits, that are terminated in compensationem damni illati, and criminal
suits, or persecutions, that are ad poenam et in vindictum criminis cammissi;
and therefore it is clearly agreed, that if one who wants discretion commits a
trespass against the person or possession of another, he shall be compelled in
a civil action to give satisfaction for the damage." 9 BAcoN's ABa'oaixrT (1848)
22, 23.
8 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW (1909) 299-301, gives an excellent resum6 of the early law of civil liability holding a lunatic to strict liability
for his torts.
4 At the time of Weaver v. Ward the law was in a period of transition. The
old concept was still a living force, with its implication that it was the objective
character of the act that was material. The new idea that even in trespass there
can be liability only if the defendant is proved at fault was as yet in its infancy.
It is, therefore, not surprising to finid courts at that tirmie looking to the quality
of the act and not at the capacity of the actor to be guilty of fault.
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sane delusions on the subject to which the words related; and where
the defendant was not totally deranged at the time of uttering the
words complained of, he may nevertheless prove the unsound condition in the mitigation of damages. If malice is not necessary in order to recover actual damages done by an unprivileged libel or slander,
an insane person may be liable to the extent of the actual damages
caused by his libel or slander, but smart money cannot be given
against him." 5 The intent referred to in the above-quoted section does
not necessarily imply the meaning usually accorded the term; it is
material only when the defamatory matter is not slanderous per se.
Malice denotes the absence of lawful excuse, or indicates :the absence
of a privileged occasion when used in the technical sense; it may
mean ill-will, too, but the existence of this latter type of malice must
be proved, while that of the former is presumed.
In order to get a clearer perspective of the question, let us go
back into history and see in what manner insanity was regarded in
the past. "Early in the history of English jurisprudence the courts did
not make a distinction between different degrees of insanity. Insanity
was regarded as A fixed term in law, having a certain meaning. If a
man were insane on one subject he was supposed to be insane on all
subjects, and for all purposes. However, at the present writing, both
legal and medical authorities recognize, different kinds and degrees of
insanity, the disease manifesting itself in different forms, varying in
nature and intensity, as there are shades of difference in the human
character. According to the modem doctrine insanity may either be
total, complete, general, or partial in its character. It may either be
permanent or temporary in duration. It may be habitual. So, also, it
may be total and permanent; or, although total in its nature, it may be
but temporary in point of duration." 6
Turning from the earliest case on the subject to the more recent one
of Wilson v. Walt,7 we find in this case that insanity was recognized
as a complete defense. In this case, the defendant accused the plaintiff, his son-in-law, of having had immoral relations with his wife, and
for this an action of slander was brought. On trial it was shown that
sometime previous the defendant had been suspected of being insane,
and that no one but the plaintiff took -thedefendant's charges seriously,
believing him to be subject to insane delusions on this point. The
Supreine Court of Kansas affirmed the decision of the lower court,
awarding judgment to the defendant, holding that in an action for
slander, the defendant may show that he was a victim of insane delusions on -the subject to which the slanderous words related. In this
case, proof of insanity was a complete defense. The words spoken were
5
6
7

LBEL AND SLADER, 32 C. J. 750.
INsAmz PERSONS, 32 C. J. 599.
138 Kan. 205, 25 Pac. (2d) 343 (1933).
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actionable per se, for they were "words falsely spoken of a person
which impute -to the party the commission of some criminal offense
involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is true,
may ,be indicted and punished." 8 This court held that an insane person would not be liable where intent or malice is a part of the slander,
if such person was subject to insane delusions on the subject to which
the words related because such delusions showed a motive on the part
of the defendant, justifiable to him. Therein lies the difference between the liability of a lunatic and a sane individual.
The decisions on the subject of an insane person's liability for his
torts are somewhat confusing, and some cases cannot be reconciled.
At the present time, however, it is generally conceded that, "a lunatic
is not responsible for a tort in which malice is an essential ingredient,
such as libel, slander, or malicious prosecution," 9 for a lunatic is
incapable of legal malice. Wilson v. Walt 10 is on all fours with Bryant
v. Jackson,1 an early Tennessee case. In this case, Bryant charged
Jackson with stealing his iron, and suit in slander was broight, resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff. On trial, the defendant offered
to prove by several witnesses that he had been for many years an
eccentric man at times wholly deranged and that during the summer
in which the words were spoken, and -before and after this season, he
was not in his sound mind. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held the
rejection of the offer to so prove was error and reversed the decision,
claiming insanity to be a good defense to an action of slander, and
holding that proof is admissible to show the state of the defendant's
mind before and after the time when the words were spoken, as tending to establish the defense. Clevenger, in his comprehensive work,
"Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity," cites Bryant v.Jackson in connection with this statdment: "Defamation, libel, and slander, by
anonymous letter-writing, or otherwise, have frequently been committed by insane persons of many kinds... False accusations and confessions of the insane have also occasioned damage to others ...
Punitive damages cannot he recovered from the insane for injuries. If
actual injury is sustained, damages may be recovered for slanderous
words spoken by a lunatic where the insanity is not so manifest and
notorious that the words could produce no effect on the hearer. But
insanity was held to be a good plea in defense to an action for slander" 12 This same case is cited in another connection by the same
author: ". . . evidence in an action for slander that the defendant was
weak-minded, and at times both before and after speaking the slanders

COOLEY ON TORTS (3rd ed.) 376-7.
9 THocx
zoiTO's CooLEY ON TORTS (1930)
10 Op. cit. supra note 7.
11

12

6 Humph. 199 (1845).
Vol. I.,pp. 206-7 (1898).

94.

NOTES
ous words was totally deranged, is competent to be considered on the
question of his insanity at the time, though it has been said that the
period of remoteness should not 'be extended further than for several
months." 13 In Dickinson v. Barber 14 evidence of insanity in a slander
suit was admitted, but the court gave no opinion on the degree of
insanity which would be received as an excuse, and said if the derangement was great and notorious, it would be manifest that the words
would have no damaging effect. The court further said that where the
degree of insanity was slight or not uniform, the slander might have
its effect, and the outcome of "the case would depend upon the verdict
of the jury. Clevenger cites a Virginia case 1 5 as authority for the
following: "And it is a sufficient ground in equity for a perpetual injuction against a judgment for slander that at the time of speaking
the defamatory words, and when the judgment was obtained, the defendant was insane or deranged on the subject to which such words
related." 16 This case has gone to great lengths in protecting the
lunatic from liability for damages for slander.
Another instance in which the court went to the limit is exemplified in an early Indiana case.1 7 This was- a slander case in which the
plaintiff complained that the defendant accused him of larceny. In
defense, the defendant claimed he was drunk at the time of the alleged statement. The court held that total drunkenness was a form
of insanity, and that a lunatic cannot be guilty of malice; and that
evidence of defendant's incompetency should have been admitted under the general denial, touching questions of malice and damages. The
court said: "In slander, under an answer containing a general denial of
the complaint, the defendant, in order to disprove malice or mitigate the
damages, may provd that when the words were spoken, his mind was so
besotted by intemperance and his character so depraved, that no one
'who knew him would have regarded what he said, or have given any
credence to any slanderous words he might have uttered." This is
perhaps the only case of its kind, and is decidedly unusual. Mix v.
McCoy 18 is directly contra, the court holding that in a suit for slander, evidence offered by the defendant, to prove the drunken condition
he was in at the time of uttering the slanderous words, was properly
excluded because drunkenness is not mitigation in an action for slander, whether pleaded or not, in that state. This last seems to be the
op. cit. supra note 12, at 493-4.

13

CLEvEGER,

14

9 Mass. 225, 6 Am. Dec. 58 (1812).

15 Homer v. Marshill, 5 Munf. 466 (1817).
16 CLEVENGER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 402.
17 Gates v. Marshall, 7 Ind. 440 (1856).
Is

22 Mo. App. 488 (1886).
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better doctrine, for the general rule seems to be that intoxication constitutes no defense to an action of slander. 19
Another Indiana case 20 is more in line with the weight of judicial
opinion. This was a case of slander in which the Supreme Court held
that, under the general issue in slander, the insanity of defendant at
the time of speaking the words may be given in evidence, and the
proof will be received in excuse or in mitigation of damages according
to the circumstances of the case. "In this country the decisions are not
altogether agreed, but a fair deduction from the later authorities gives
the doctrine that insanity is not in itself a defense for libel or slander,
but may be sufficient under the circumstances of the case to defeat a
recovery by disproving any damage, as well as any malice, because the
well-known insanity of the defendant may have prevented any heed
being given to the remarks." 21
In regard to other torts, a lunatic is held to a very strict degree of
liability.22 "While a guilty intent is an essential element of criminal

responsibility, intent is not generally an essential element of liability
for tortious acts or negligence, and hence -the general rule is that an
insane person may be liable for his torts the salne as a sane person,
except perhaps those in which malice, and therefore intention, is a
necessary ingredient, as in the case of libel and slander." 23 He is
liable for an assault as shown by a Tennessee case, 24 in which W. shot
19 McKee v. Ingalls, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 30 (1842); Reed v. Harper, 25 Iowa
87 (1868); Williams v. McManus, 38 La. Ann., 58 Am. Rep. 171 (1886). "It may

be matter in mitigation." Note, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1198.
20 Yeates v. Reed, 4 Blackf. 463, 32 Am. Dec. 43 (1838).
21 Note, 26 L. R. A. 154.
22 "If a lunatic commit a treapass upon A's lands or goods, he has trespass; for though the lunatic is excused critninaliter, he is not citqliter." 5 DANE,
A GENERAL ABRI GMENT AND DIGEST or AmEmIcAw LAW (1824) 580.
"It is universally held that mere infancy or insanity does not preclude liability
for the impairment of another's bodily condition or physical condition of another's property caused by conduct which, if that of an adult or mentally normal
person would be a wrong of aggression or negligence." BOHLEN, STUDIES IN Ttm
LAw Or TORTS (1926) 543.
An extensive treatment of the liability of an insane person for his torts, entitled "Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort," is given by W. G. H. Cook, in 21
Col. L. R. 333.
"In the law of contracts, various grounds of personal disability have to be
considered with some care. Infants, married women, lunatics, are in different
degrees and for different reasons incapable of the duties and rights arising out
of contracts. In the law of torts it is otherwise. Generally speaking, there is no
limit to personal capacity either in becoming liable for civil injuries or in the
power of obtaining redress for them." PoLLocx, THE LAw Or ToRrs (12th ed.) 52.
23 INSANE PERsoNs, 32 C. J. 749, 750.
24 Ward v. Conatser, 4 Baxt. 64 (1874).
In discussing a New Zealand case (Brennan v. Donaghy, 19 N. Z. L. R. 289),
holding a lunatic civilly liable for assault even if he is unconscious of the nature
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C. and recovery was permitted the latter on the ground that, if refused,
the party suffering would be without redress. The court stated it. was
immaterial whether the injury be wilful or not, and held that in a
civil action to recover damages for an injury inflicted upon the person
or property of another by a lunatic, insanity cannot be looked to as
a justification of the wrong, but that while the insane person will be
liable for actual damages resulting from the injury, punitive or vindictive damages cannot be recovered. And in the case of Cross v.
Kent,2

5

where a lunatic burned her neighbor's barn, she was held liable

for the value of the barn, the court saying that lunacy was no defense
against liability for compensatory damages, nor was evidence of
lunacy admissible in mitigation of damages. An outstanding case is
that of Williams v. Hays.2 6 The defendant in this case was the captain of a vessel in which he owned a minority and which he had
chartered from his co-owners. The ship started from the coast of
Maine for southern shores and encountered heavy storms which required the defendant to be constantly on deck for two days. He became exhausted and went to his cabin, leaving the ship in charge of
the mate and crew. The mate, finding the rudder broken and the ship
drifting upon a lee shore, called 'the defendant on deck. The defendant
refused the assistance of two tugs which successively offered to take
the ship in tow, and refused to drop the anchors, and so permitted
the ship to drift upon the shore in calm weather. The ship became
a total wreck, -and defendant's co-owners brought. action against him.
The defendant tried to set up temporary insanity as a defense, but to
no avail. The court said: "The general rule is that an insane person isjust as responsible for his torts as a sane person, and the rule applies
to all torts, except, perhaps, those in which malice, and therefore intention, actual or imputed, is a necessary ingredient, like libel, slander,
and malicious prosecution. In all other torts, intention is not an ingredient, and the actor is responsible, although he acted with a good
and even laudable purpose, without any malice." The unique ruling
of this court, holding that if 'the defendant brought about the ship's
destruction by what in sane persons would be wilful or negligent conduct he would be responsible, is perhaps the only one of its kind, and
has been widely criticized. A curious part of the decision was that in
which the court suggested that the defendant might not be liable if
he became insane caring for the ship during the storm. Another inand consequences of his acts and incapable of understanding them, Pollock says:
"This, it is submitted, is erroneous in principle and not required by any English
authority. The defence is not that the actor was insane, but that there was no
real voluntary act at all. Liability can be imposed in such a case only on the
obsolete theory that inevitable accident is no excuse." POLLocK, op. cit. supra
note 22, at 53.
25 32 Md. Rep. 581 (1870).
26 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449 (1894).
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portant case is McIntyre v. Skolty,2 7 in which it was said that for
killing a person the defense of insanity will not avail to defeat a judgment for mere compensation in a civil case. The shooting in this case
was under such circumstances as would have made the act a felony
if the defendant had been actually sane. The court held that punishment is not the object of the law when persons unsound in mind are
the wrongdoers; the question of liability is of public policy. If an insane person is not held liable for his torts, the court reasoned, those
interested in his estate, as relations or otherwise, might not have a
sufficient motive to so take care of him as to deprive him of opportunities for inflicting injuries upon others. There is more injustice, the
court continued, in denying to the injured party the recovery of damages for the wrong suffered by him than there is in calling upon the
relatives or friends of the lunatic to pay the expense of his confinement, if he has no estate ample enough for that purpose.
Insanity is often a large factor in regard to insurance, especially is
this so when an effort is made to recover upon a life insurance policy
of a lunatic who has committed suicide. In such a case, recovery de28
pends entirely upon the construction of the insurance contract,
or upon statute (if there is one governing the case), or upon both.
Where it is dependent upon the contract, there is authority to the
effect that insanity excuses. "An insurer in a life policy stating that on
the death of the insured by self-destruction, sane or insane, the insurer shall be liable only for the return of the premiums paid, is
liable for the face of the policy where the insured at the time he
killed himself was so insane that he did not know that he was taking his life, or did not know that the act he was committing would
probably result in death."-,9 A later case 30 from the same state is in
accord, as is an Iowa case. 31 Recovery under statute has been permitted in several instances, notably in Georgia and Indiana. In the
former state it has been decided that a statute providing no recovery
for suicide does not apply in the case of self-destruction by a lunatic,
for such an act is not legally suicide. 32 In the latter state it has been
held that under a statute providing that suicide shall not defeat recov2"

121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140 (1887).
"The generally accepted rule is that a clause in a policy of life insurance
exempting the insurer from liability on the policy in case the insured dies by his
own hand, or by suicide, 'sane or insane,' is a valid limitation of the liability of
the insurer, and operates to avoid the policy in the event of the suicide of the
insured while insane." Note, 7 Ann. Cas. 659, citing many cases.
29 Inter-Southern life Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 124 S. W. 333 (Ky. 1910).
3o Vicars v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Ky. 1, 164 S. W. 106 (1914).
31 Gavin v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 149 Iowa 152, 126 N. W. 906 (1910).
32 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Durden, 9 Ga. App. 297, 72 S. E. 295
(1911).
28
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ery on a life policy, "suicide" is not used technically, but means death
by one's hand, irrespective of mental condition. 33
Judging from the decisions noted in the preceeding paragraphs, no
hard and fast rule can be set in regard to a lunatic's liability for his
torts. While it is almost universally -held that an insane person is liable
for his torts, with the exception of those involving intent, it is these
last which give rise to much discussion. Many cases have dealt with
the subject, but it is doubtful whether in any one of them a clearer
statement can be found than this: "Legal malice certainly cannot be
imputed to one who in law is incompetent to harbor an intent. It
would seem a monstrous absurdity, for instance, if one were held
entitled to maintain an action for defamation of character for the
thoughtless babbling of an insane person, or for any wild communication he might send through the mail or post upon the wall. There
can be no tort in these cases because the wrong lies in the intent, and
an intent is an impossibility. The rules which preclude criminal responsibility are strictly applicable here, because there is an absence of
the same necessary element. And if, in the case of defamatory publications, it may be said that, after all, the requirements of malice as
an element in the wrong is only nominal, still there can be no tort
because presumptively the utterances, or rather publications, which
proceed from a diseased brain, cannot injure." 34
Richard A. Molique:

NUISANCES-EXTENT

OF

LIABILITY.-The term "nuisance" "in its

legal sense has been defined countless 'times by text writers and by
the courts.1 An appalling variety of structures and activities have
been declared to be actionable nuisances.2 But the definitions have
been so broad, and the term applied to such a variety of wrongful
conduct that a general conception of the scope of the term is difficult
to grasp. What is the basis of liability for a nuisance? What are the
limitations of the term? We know that it is flexible in its application,
but is there not something fundamentally the same about every actionable nuisance?
Blackstone defined a private nuisance as "anything done to the
hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another." 3 The important element of actionable nuisance, according to
33 Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America v. Smith, 183 Ind. 59, 107 N. E.
283 (1914).
34 Coorxy, op. cit. supra note 8, at 103.
1 NuisAcEs, 46 C. J. § 1.
2 See NuiAxcks, 46 C. J. pp. 637 to 640 for an enumeration.
3 BLAcusroT's COmMENTARIS 216.
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this definition, is the kurt or annoyance to another's realty. The conduct of the actor is of no importance. Whether the resultant harm
was the fault of the actor is beside the point. When Blackstone wrote,
fault was not essential to legal liability, wether the injury was to
person, personalty or realty.4 But today when practically all tort
liability is based on conduct that is either wilful, negligent, or extrahazardous, we find Blackstone's definition quoted with approval in
many cases, 5 and its substance contained in any new definition. 6 Nuisance, then, is, even today, actionable though its creator is without
fault.7 The fact that responsibility for a nuisance does not depend
upon fault means that there must be something peculiar in a nuisance
which impel the courts to give such absolute protection to people
against this wrong.
The early view of the courts was that an actor was absolutely liable
for the proximate results of his acts. This view is perhaps best expressed in the words of Judge Brian in an Anonymous case 8 of 1466.
'WVhen one does an act he is bound to act in such a way as not to
prejudice others, etc. As if, I am building a house, and a piece of timber
falls on my neighbor's house and breaks his house he shall have a good
action; and yet the raising of the house was lawful and the timber
fell on me invito, etc. And so, if one assaults me and I would escape,
and in self-defense lift my stick to strike him, and in lifting it hit a
man who is behind me, in this case he shall have an act against me,
and yet my act was lawful and I hit him invito, etc."
That this strict test of liability had been changed but little since
Blackstone's time is evident from his words in the celebrated case of
Scott v. Sheperd.9 In discussing the case he intimated that while Sheperd, the one who originally threw the squib, might be liable in a proper
action for the consequential damage from his mischievous act, Ryal,
the one who last threw the squib to prevent harm to himself, would
be liable in trespass. "Not even menaces from others are sufficient to
justify a trespass against a third person. Much less a fear of danger
to either his gods or his person ;-nothing but inevitable necessity;
Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Dickenson and Watson, T. Jones, 205;
4 See Blackstone's opinion iii Scott v. Sheperd, 3 Win. Blackstone 892,
96 Eng. Rep. 527 (1772), discussed further on in this note.
5 NuisAscs, 46 C. J. § 1, note 14 b.

6

NuisANCEs, 46 C. J. § 1.

7 That this conclusion is correctly deduced from the definition, see NuisANcEs,
46 C.
intent
is not
excuse
8
9

J. § 26, and cases cited in note 43, which hold that lack of malice or the
to injure is no defense; and see NuISANCEs, 46 C. J. § 28, that negligence
necessary in a nuisance, and that due care to avoid injuring others is no
if a nuisance exists.
Y. B. Edward IV, 7 pl. 18 (1466).
Op. cit. supra note 4.

NOTES
Gilbert and Stone, Al. 35, Styl. 72." He then quoted with approval
the opinion of Judge Brian set out above.
Thus it is no wonder that his definition of nuisance made no mention of fault in the actor. Fault, as we know it today in the law,
was not comprehended as a test of liability at that time.
In Brown v. Kendall 10 the test of negligence for liability in nonwilful conduct finally emerged. In this case the defendant was attempting to separate two fighting dogs by beating them with a stick.
In the struggle the dogs approached the plaintiff's position. The defendant in backing from them came close to the plaintiff and in swinging the stick to hit the dogs struck the plaintiff in the eye seriously
injuring him. The trial court had instructed the jury that unless it
was an "inevitable" accident the defendant was responsible. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed a decision in favor of
plaintiff under this instruction. It appeared.to the court that the reason for holding one absolutely liable for the proximate results of his
acts was largely due to a misunderstanding of the statement in the
old cases that when one receives injury from the direct act of another
trespass will lie. This statement the court felt was merely stating
the elements for an action of trespass as against an action on the case,
and not a test of liability. Although the criticism hardly seems justified
when. we examine the words of Brian and the approving words of
Blackstone set out above, the test of liability which the court then
announced was undoubtedly the sentiment of judicial opinion of the
time and -was soon followed by all courts:" "... . if it appears that
the defendant was doing a lawful act, and unintentionatly hit and
hurt the plaintiff, then unless it also appears to the satisfaction of the
jury, that the defendant is chargeable with some fault, negligence,
carelessness, or want of prudence, the plaintiff fails to sustain the
burden of proof, and is not entitled to recover."
We have said that Blackstone's definition is as applicable to nuisance today as when he wrote it. We have said that fault in the sense
of wilful or negligent conduct is not necessary for an actionable nuisance. We must now determine why the courts did not follow the lead
of Brown v. Kendall12 in considering nuisance liability.
10 60 Mass. 292 (;850).
11 "The doctrine of strict liability, or liability without fault, seems far
removed indeed from the rule of 'no' liability without fault' as expressed by the
courts in the leading American case of Brown v. Kendall (1850) and in the leading English case of Stanley v. Powell (1890) [1 Q. B. D. 86], as well as in
a sizable line of cases that filthe books in both countries since that date."
Harris, Liability Without Fault (1932) 6 Tu.AN L. Ray. 337, 347, and cases

cited.
12

Op. dt. supra note 10.
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Nuisance was not the only wrong in which the courts determined
that fault was unnecessary. The rest of these exceptional types of
wrong are listed in an article 13 by Dean Harris of Tulane University.
Of these few exceptions, fully half relate to injury to real property.
Trespass to land, the removal of adjacent support and the escape of
extra-hazardous substance to the land of another are all cases in which
the actor is held absolutely liable. Liability for harm to real property
then, was not governed by rules of negligence, 14 and since nuisance
was an injury to the "lands, tenements or hereditaments of another"
it is logical to suppose that nuisance continued to be in the "liability
without fault class" because of the peculiar position of harm to realty
in the law of torts.
This reason for the sanctity of real property is never actually
explained in the cases. But that it is recognized is beyond doubt. In
Louisville Ry. Co. v. Sweeney 15 the court said: "The plaintiff as the
owner of her property was entitled to the undisputed possession of it.
The entry of the defendant upon it either by its street car or by the
pole which it set in motion was a trespass. One who trespasses upon
another and inflicts an injury is liable for the injury unless caused by
the act of God or produced by causes beyond his control. We have
held that one who in blasting throws rock or other d6bris upon the
land of another is liable for the injury done irrespective of whether the
blasting was negligently done or not, as there is in such a case an
actual invasion of another's premises, and the act itself is a nuisance.
The same principle has been applied to the pollution of air or the
abstraction of any portion of the soil, or the casting of anything upon
the land in other ways." It is submitted that the reason for the fixed
liability for harm to realty is the fixed nature of realty itself. Persons
and personal property are not fixed in their location. The actor sought
to be charged with -liability for injury to these is constantly meeting
them under different circumstances. It is only fair then that he only
be held to exercise care under the particular circumstances. Responsibility should shift as the circumstances shift. But land he always
meets under the same circumstances. Wherever he goes and whatever
he does he encounters land which he must know belongs to others if
it is not his own. Any time then that he acts he should be compelled
to keep his activities on neutral ground or his own land.
Harris, op. cit. supra note 11, at 352-355.
14 "It seems clear that every man was originally considered liable quite
irrespective of moral fault, for the harm whether to another person, personal
property or real estate, which his acts had directly caused, and that while the
rigor of the early rule was relaxed at an early date when the harm was done to
the person or personal property, it persisted unchanged where real estate was injured or invaded, or the owner's occupation and enjoyment of and dominion over
it was interferred with." BonLmE, Sruvrxs IN THE LAw Op ToRi"S (1926) 358.
15 157 Ky. 620, 163 S. W. 739, 740 (1914).
13

NOTES
It has been presented that liability for those hurts or annoyances
called "nuisances" is justly fixed without fault because they are annoyances to realty. Before discussing what are "hurts or annoyances" in
actionable nuisance we must look into those few cases where we find
people without any interest in realty collecting damages for harm resulting from a private nuisance.
Personal injury liability generally depends on negligent or wilful
conduct. 16 Liability for nuisance does not necessarily depend on
fault.1 7 If liability for nuisance extends to injury to the person of one

.having no interest in land, justification for the "no fault" doctrine
must be found in the nature of the harm done and not in the fact that
it is injury to realty. Thus, either the cases which allow recovery for
personal injuries 1 8 caused by a private nuisance are wrong, or the
basis of liability advanced by this note is wrong.
It is submitted that the cases are wrong. Ft. Worth & R. G. R.
Co. v. Glenn 19 is the leading case allowing recovery for injury to
person by one having no estate in land. The plaintiff in this case was
a child living at home on land owned by his father. The nuisance consisted in an old well on the defendant's premises which had become
filthy. The plaintiff was made sick and suffered pain and discomfort
as a result of the stench from the well. Thd reasoning of the case can
best be shown by the following quotation from the decision of the
Texas court: "If a suit be brought for an injury to real estate caused
by a nuisance, it is clear that the plaintiff must show that he has some
right which has been injuriously affected. If the damage be to the
right of those occupying the property at the time, he must prove title,
or at least a right of occupancy. If it be of such permanent character
as to cause damage to an estate in reversion or remainder, the reversioner or remainderman, if he sue, must prove .his title as such. But
why should the owner of a house be allowed to recover damages for
being made sick by a nuisance created in the vicinity thereof, and
another lawful occupant be denied a remedy for a like reason? . .. It
seems to us that a conflict of opinion upon this question has risen
from confusing the damage which results to property from "anuisance
16 See Harris, .oc. cit. supra note 11, and cases cited.
17 See NUISAxCES, 46 C. J.§ § 26, 28.
1s When personal injury liability is referred to, we are speaking of injuries
to the person of one who has no interest in the land where he receives the injury.
Where a person has such interest in land he may of course recover for personal
injuries to himself because that is a true measure of the damage to his enjoyment
of the land. The injury itself is to the land. That the, damages recoverable are
not confined to the actual physical damage to the property has been long recognized. NuiSANCES, 46 C. J.§ 498, note 73.
19 97 Tex. 586, 80 S. W. 992, 65 L. R. A. 818, 104 Am. St. Rep. 894, 1 Ann
Cas. 270 (1904).
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with the special damage, such as sickness, which may result to an
individual from a nuisance either public or private."
In the course of this argument the court cited two cases, Holly v.
Boston Gaslight Co. 2 0 and Hunt v. Lowell Gaslight Co. 2 1 These cases

did not support the argument but by clear inference pointed out that
nuisance could not be the basis of recovery. In Holly v. Boston Gaslight Co. a child living upon her father's premises sought recovery for
injury from gas which escaped from defendant's main. The court
specifically denied the right to recover unless negligence of the defendafnt was shown and contributory negligence of the plaintiff was
negatived. In short, liability for personal injuries was to be found as
in all personal injury cases on a showing of negligence. Likewise in
Hunt v. Lowell Gaslight Co., where visitors in another's home recovered damages for illness caused by gas escaping from the defendant's
main through a sewer pipe into the house, the court said that defendants were liable, "provided the jury should find that the plaintiffs
were not guilty of negligence and that the defendants were guilty of
negligence." The Texas court was certainly in error when they held
the plaintiff entitled to recover in an action for nuisance, on the
strength of two negligence cases. It is reasonable to suppose that negligence could have been found in the Texas case and the result would
have been the same.' But in basing the right to recover on nuisance
in which fault plays no part the court did not follow the lead of the
cases-ft cited.
Does the court assert in its argument any real reason why nuisance
liability should extend to personal injuries? It asserts that the reason
for pleading an interest in land in most cases is that recovery is
usually sought for an injury to that interest, but that where a person
is injured he should be entitled to recover for his particular type of
injury. If this be true it leaves no explanation for the fact that fault
is not a necessary element of nuisance. Without an explanation of
that fact the court's argument has no weight. Its conclusion would
leave liability for personal injuries depending in some cases on negligence, and in others on the mere showing of injury without fault, and
this without an explanation of why the difference should exist. Perhaps the court felt that there was something inherent in the type of
annoyance.known as nuisance which would justify this strict liability,
as compared with the type of annoyance in which negligence is the
proper test. But it pointed out no such difference exists, and in truth
there is none, as will be seen from our discussion of "hurt or annoyance" further on in this note.
20
21

8 Gray (Mass.) 123, 69 Am. Dec. 233 (1857).
8 Alien (Mass.) 169, 85 Am. Dec. 697 (1864).

NOTES
There are four other cases usually cited as supporting the rule of
Fort Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Glenn. In Towaliga Falls Power Co.
v. Sims

22

the court took occasion to approve the rule although it had

no place in the case since the suit was by a tenant at will whom the
court held had an interest in land. The Georgia court said "It is hardly
consistent with the modem idea of legal rights, wrongs, and remedies.. ." to deny recovery to one lawfully on the premises for injury to
himself simply. because he has no interest in the land-and yet some
courts go to this extent.
Two Alabana cases approve the doctrine. In one 23 the court argues
along the same lines as the Texas court and there is no need to repeat
the criticism of this argument. In the other case 24 the court merely
approves the principle without reason, and in this case the principle
was of no importance since the plaintiff owned property.
An Indiana case 2 5 adds nothing to the argument. It approves in
general terms the doctrine of the cases criticized above. But its decision
gains strength from an Indiana statute 26 which defined nuisance. The
part of this statute, which justified the decision, provides: "Whatever
is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially to interfere
.with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance, and

the subject of an action."
Each of these cases fails to support the rule which it states. Recovery for personal injuries by one without an interest in realty, on
22 6 Ga. App. 749, 65 S. E. 844 (1909).
23 Hosmer v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 179 Ala. 415, 60 So. 801, 43 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 871 (1913). This was an action for damages because of the death of
plaintiff's intestate claimed to be due to noxious air from a pond which defendant corporation constructed in the neighborhood of plaintiff's residence.
The intestate was the minor child of the plaintiff who sued as the child's personal representative. The child had no interest-in te land. A demurrer to the

complaint was sustained by the trial court. The court reversed this ruling declaring
that an interest in land was not necessary. Justice Sayre said: "It is obvious
that to maintain an action for an injury affecting the value of the freehold the
plaintiff must have a legal estate. But if noxious vapors and the like cause sickness and death to one who has a lawful habitation in the neighborhood, no sufficient reason is to be found in the accepted definition of nuisance, nor in that
policy of the courts which would discourage vexatious litigation, nor in the
inherent justice of the situation, as we see it, why the person injured, or his
personal representative in case of death, should not have reparation in damages
for any special injury he may have suffered, although he has no legal estate
in the soil."
24 Shelby Iron Co. v. Greenlea, 184 Ala. 496, 63 So. 470 (1913).
25 Pere Marquette R. Co; v. 'Chadwick, 65 Ind. App. 95, 115 N. E. 678
(1917). This was an action to recover for wrongful death of child, alleged to be
caused by noxious air from a nuisance maintained by defendant. The child had
no interest in the land.
26 IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1914) § 291.
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the basis of nuisance liability, is not justified. Lest the conclusion
seem like an inhuman disregard of personal rights we should note
two factors which soften the picture. First, the person may often recover on the theory of negligence, which is the general test of liability
for nonwilful injury to person. 27 . Secondly, the owner of the property
is generally the head of the family. If he pays out money in caring
for himself or members of the family made ill by a nuisance, this is
recoverable in an action against the one who creates or maintains the
28
nuisance.
There are many cases which support the theories advanced in this
article, and are contrary to the five cases we have criticised. In Ellis
v. Kansas City R. Co.29 the plaintiff sued for illness caused by the
stench from a dead horse left by the railway along its line for some
time after it had been killed. The title to the land had been in the
plaintiff's husband who died before the suit. The court denied recovery. It quoted with approval Blackstone's definition of nuisance
and held that an injury to an interest in land was the basis for recovery.80 In England the basis of liability is definitely established
along the lines we have discussed. The plaintiff in Malone v. Laskey 31
was living on premises which her husband held as a sub-lessee. Defendants operated a generating plant on the adjoining premises, and
defendants were also the owners of the premises which were sub-let
to plaintiff's husband. The vibration of the generating plant, it was
alleged, had weakened the water tank on the premises of the plaintiff's
husband. Although under no duty to repair, the defendants had
braced this tank. The brace later fell on the plaintiff. She sued on
the theory of negligence in repairing the tank and also on the theory
that the nuisance of vibration had caused the harm. The court held
that negligence was the proper theory of recovery in sudn case although in this case a cause of action was not made out. But the
court emphatically denied recovery on nuisance theory because, as Sir
Gorell Barnes said: ".

.

. no authority was cited, nor in my opinion

can any principle of law be formulated, to the effect that a person
27
28

29

See HAms, op. cit. supra note 11, and cases cited.
cited.

NursANcFs, 46 C. J. § 501, and cases
63 Mo. 131, 21 Am. Rep. 436 (1876).

30 Other cases in accord with this are: Kavanaugh v. Barber, 131 N. Y. 211,
30 N. E. 235, 15 L. R. A. 689 (1892); McCalla v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 163
Ala. 107, 50 So. 971 (1909) (It is interesting to note that Justice Sayre, who
wrote this opinion, four years later wrote the opinion in Hosmer v. Republic Iron
& Steel Co., op. cit. supra note 23, which in -effect overrules the McCall case.);
Elliot v. Mason, 76 N. H. 229, 81 Atl. 701, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357 (1911), in
which the case of Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Glenn is criticized in an excellent
discussion; Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 At. 688, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 667
(1909); Rober v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 138 So. 524 (Miss. 1932).
31 [1907] 2 K. B. 141.

NOTES
who has no interest in property, no right of occupation in the proper
sense of the term, can maintain an action for a nuisance arising from
the vibration caused by the working of an engine in an adjoining
house."
In Cunard and Wife v. Antifyre, Ltd.,32 the English court again
carefully pointed out the difference between nuisance and negligence.
In this case the plaintiffs were occupants of a flat on the third floor
of a tenement house. The glass roof of plaintiffs' apartment extended
beyond the roof of the tenement which was in control of the defendants. Part of the guttering fell through the glass roof and injured the
wife. The court held that as mere occupants having no interest in the
land, they had no right to maintain an action on the theory of nuisance. But the court did hold that the defendants were responsible
for the exercise of due care in keeping the structure safe and that, on
the showing of negligence, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.
We have arrived at the conclusion that an actionable nuisance is
found to exist whenever the realty of one has suffered "hurt or annoyance" from another's acts. We have determined that the injury
must be to an interest in land, and that the fault of the actor is not
necessary. There remains therefore the question of what constitutes
a "hurt or annoyance" which the courts will recognize.
From the earliest times although the injury was spoken of as to
the lands, it was not confined to physical hurt to the property but
included injuries to the enjoyment of the property. Thus in addition
to physical hurt to the land such as throwing water back upon it,
Blackstone notes that injuries to the enjoyment of land, such as the
"stopping of ancient lights" and "corrupting the air with noisome
smells," were actionable nuisances. 33
Today the same interests, the land and the enjoyment of the rights
in the land incident to its possession, are protected. But because an
injury to the rights in the land incident to its possession is a
nuisance, the set of facts which make out an actionable nuisance
must necessarily depend upon the courts' idea of what rights are
properly incident to the possession of land. Since the actor's liability does not necessarily depend upon fault, in nuisance, it means
that he is being restricted in conduct that is essentially right in order
to protect other rights. The question of what constitutes a "hurt or
annoyance" depends on a balancing of these rights. It is a question
of degree. Bohlen expresses this idea thus: 34 "In every case where,
by lawful and careful use of his land, an owner infringes his neighbor's
exclusive occupation and enjoyment of and dominion over his land,
32

33
34

[1933] 1 K. B. 551.
C0Mo NTARIMS 217, 218.
BOHLEN, op. dt. supra note 14, at 367, 368.
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there arises a conflict of antagonistic interests; and this conflict is not
merely between the interests of the particular parties but involves a
far wider antagonism. The ownership of land carries with it two
beneficial incidents-each of which has come to be recognized as a
legal right-the 'right' of exclusive occupation, enjoyment and dominion, and the 'right' to utilize it for the owner's social and economic
purposes. When these two rights conflict which is to prevail?" After
some discussion he goes on to say: "The solution must depend upon
the existing social, political and economic conditions and conceptions
prevailing at the particular time and in the particular place, the traditional attitude of mind and habit of thought, even the prejudices, of
the class then and there dominating public thought."
It is doubtful if we can arrive in more definite terms at the conception of a nuisance. Specific examples of nuisances would help little
since the field is so broad. It would perhaps be best to conclude by
pointing out the general tests applied by the courts in the determination of what a nuisance consists. These tests reflect in a concrete way
the effect of the factors which Bohlen points out as controlling the
problem of balancing these two rights.
The injury or annoyance must be a substantial character 85 to
persons of ordinary health, tastes, sensibilities and habits of living. 6
Social conceptions demand that the annoyance be measured by that
which would annoy the average man. If another negligently interferes
with that right by his activity or failure to act, a nuisance certainly
exists 37 because the actor's conduct ceases to be right and proper
when he has become negligent. But where the conduct of the actor is
right in a moral sense (as we have so often said it may be, and yet
be a nuisance), and yet interferes with possessory rights, the economic
and political elements are the strong determining factors. Thus so
that manufacturing and industry may be fostered, the locality38 of
the alleged nuisance may be considered and an activity which would
be a nuisance in a residential section might not be one in a manufacturing section. And that commerce and trade may be encouraged one
who lives in a city or village must endure the ordinary inconveniences
that city life demands.8 9 The mere fact that the nuisance was established before the complainant moved into the neighborhood will not
justify it. 40 But such a fact may be evidence of the reasonableness of
the activity for the locality.
Robert B. Devine.
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NOTES
STRIKEs-BOYCOTTs--RIGHT

TO JOIN A

UNION.-In the current

legal and financial uproar caused by the National Industrial Recovery
Act the power and popularity of the strike and the lockout have taken
on new vigor. The New Deal is giving the labor unions stronger backing
than they have ever had before, and in the eternal conflict between
capital and labor the strike bids fair to appear as a decisive weapon.
The unions have, always had to rely on the strike and its less-favored
sister, thie boycott. But hitherto it has been more of a defense; the
employer had the option of calling on "scabs" to tide him over the
emergency, with the police to enforce the doctrines of peaceful picketing. And after one such experience the employer more likely than not
would choose his employees from nonunion applicants, making nonmembership in any union a prerequisite to employment. Then the
union's only resort was the boycott, and this has long been held illegal.
But under the National Recovery Act the situation has changed and
the union is high man on the see-saw.
In the new order of things the following doctrines are prescribed:'
"Every code of fair competition, agreement and license approved,
prescribed, or issued under this chapter shall contain the following
conditions: (1) That employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers
of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (2) that no
employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from
joining, organizing, or assisting . a labor organization of his own
choosing..."
Thus it will be seen that willy-nilly, like it or not, an employer may
not prevent his employees from being members of a union if they so
desire. Legislative attempts of this nature have 'been often made before on behalf of labor unions, lnd always they have been held void
and unconstitutional. The court said, in one such case: 2 "The rights of
liberty and property include the right to acquire property by labor and
by contract. Ritchie v. People 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454... The right ofof property involves, as one of its essential attributes, the right not only
liberty and property, the right to acquire property by labor and by
contract. Ritchie v. People 155 I1. 98, 40 N. E. 454... The right of
property involves, as one of its essential attributes, the right not only
to contract, but also to terminate contracts .... The act of 1893, now
1 15 U. S. C. A. § 707a.
2 Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill.
176, 58 N. E. 1007, 1009, 1010, 52 L. R. A.
283 (1900).
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under consideration, deprives the employer of the right to terminate
his contract with his employee . . . we are of the opinion that this act
contravenes those provisions of the state and federal constitution
which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." In the right of contract there
is also the right of the employer to set the terms of his contract; this
too is abrogated by the foregoing provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. However, most of the cases dealing with legislation
of this sort did not deny the right of the worker to organize, The
objections were raised to laws which attempted to make misdemeanors
of an employer's prerequisites of nonmembership in a union to employment. The weight of authority today is that laborers have
the right to organize, 3 only that "it must always be exercised with
reasonable regard for the conflicting rights of others." 4 With this
right to organize has gone the right to strike. As it was held in 1891,5
"An injunction will not lie to restrain handicraftsmen from combining
and peacefully and without intimidation persuading their fellow workmen to leave the service of their employers in order to compel an
advance in wages on the ground that such persuasion invades the
constitutional right of the employer to prosecute his business free from
unlawful obstruction." Modem holdings are in accord with this.6
Striking itself, however, would have little strength without picketing.
The courts have rarely refused to allow peaceful picketing. It was held
in a recent case that the right to strike includes the right to use peaceable and lawful means to induce present and expectant employees to
join the ranks. 7 However, the courts have been unfailingly severe in
their attitude towards militant picketing. The measure of just what
is allowable for picketers .is perhaps best set out in the justly famous
case of Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy:8 ". . . a combination of
employers or a combination of employees, the object of which is to
interfere with the freedom of the employer to employ, or of the employee to be employed . . . by means of such molestation or personal
annoyance as would be liable to coerce the person upon whom it was
S Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (C.C. A. 7th, 1894); Thomas v. Cincinnati
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1894); Alaska S. S.

Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 236 Fed. 964 (D.C. W. D. Wash.
1916); Wabash R. Co. v. Hannan, 121 Fed. 563 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1903).
4 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. ed. 260,
L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461 (1916); Brennan v. United Hatters

of North America, Local No. 17, 73 N. J. Law 729, 65 AtI. 165 (1906).
5 Rogers v. Evarts, 171 N. Y. S. 264 (1891).
6 Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, 172 AtI. 551 (N. J.
1934).
7

Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, op. cit. supra

note 6.
8 53 At. 230, 234 (N. J. 1902).

NOTES
inflicted, assuming that he is reasonably courageous and not unreasonably sensitive, to refrain from employing or being employed, is illegal,
and founds an action for damages on the part of any person knowingly
injured in respect of his 'probable expectancy' by such interference,
and also, when the other necessary conditions exist, affords the basis
of an injunction from a court of equity." But just what are these
molestations and annoyances which would coerce a person not "unreasonably sensitive"? In Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers
Co. 9 it was held that an employer is entitled to enjoin striking workers
from keeping other workers away by use of vile and abusive language,
threats of violence and assault. In another case 10 it was stated that
peaceful picketing 'by the striking members of a labor union in reasonable numbers for the purpose of observation only is lawful. Recognizing
that violence is all too often the inevitable result of any picketing,
however well-intended, the courts have in some cases refused to allow
it at all. In Vegelahn v. Guntner11 an injunction was granted which
restrained the defendants "from interfering with the plaintiff's business
by patrolling the sidewalk or street in front, or in the vicinity, of the
premises occupied by him, for the purpose of preventing any person
or persons who are now or may hereafter be in his employment, or
desirous of entering the same, from entering it, or continuing in it."
The other threat of the Union, the boycott, may be dismissed briefly.
2
This has invariably been held illegal, as an unlawful combination.'
The justice and logic of this holding may be clearly understood from
the excellent reasoning in the case of Iron Molders' Union v. AllisChalmers Co.: 13 "In contests between capital and labor the only
means of injuring each other that are lawful are those that operate
directly and immediately upon the control and supply of work to be
done and of labor to do it, and thus directly affect the apportionment
of the common fund, for only at this point exists the competition, the
evils of which organized society will endure rather than suppress the
freedom and initiative of the individual. But attempts to injure each
other by coercing members of society who are not directly concerned
in the pending controversy to make raids in the rear cannot be tolerated
by organized society, for the direct, the primary, attack is upon society
itself."
9

1908).

Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th,

10 Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 59 N. J. Eq.
49, 46 Atl. 208 (1899).
11 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896). Accord: Beck v. Railway Teamsters
Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898).
12 Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888); Arthur v. Oakes,
op. dt. supra note 3; Gompers v. Buck's Stove & R. Co., 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed.
797 (1911).
Is Op. cit. supra note 9.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

These, then, are the weapons of the labor union,--the one, boycott,
illegal, and the other, strike picketing, legal only so long as peacefuland occasionally not then. And these weapons are useful only when
the employees are members of the union. They may not be forced on
the employees whether the latter want them or not, merely because
14
it would be to their benefit by improving their working conditions.
Nor will some courts allow unions to solicit membership in a nonunion shop.15 Thus, before the measures of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, employers had the option of bargaining with union
employees, subject to their right to strike, or absolutely refusing to
deal with them by making nonmembership in a union a pre-requisite
to employment, subject to dismissal if membership were taken out
later.
Now what is the situation? According to those provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, quoted at the beginning of this
note, an employer may no longer demand nonmembership in a union a
prerequisite to employment. It may be said, Well, but he is not denied
the right to hire nonunion workers. Granted; but where is he to
find them, and how? If the employer does question the prospective
employee as to his membership in a labor union, it would seem that he
is making nonmembership in a union a condition to employment which
would, in substance, constitute a violation of the code. The whole
process must be veiled in mystery, much as the taking of the vows of
a novitiate in a secret society.
To make what it is hoped will not seem like an awkward attempt
to tie all these points together, here is the prospect for the employer.
First, practically speaking, he must hire union workers. Secondly, he
must arbitrate with their representatives. Thirdly, if he cannot reach
an agreement with them, he is subject to a strike, and a subsequent
delay and loss of business. Although, theoretically, he may run an
open shop, it is not permissible for him to question an employee in
regards to his membership in a union, lest a subsequent dismissal point
to the question as to membership as a motive. It is a valid question
to ask whether this does not interfere with employers' "probable expectancy" in the labor market that is protected by the Jersey City Printing Co. case? Is it not a violation of the right of contract and the
due process clause, as pointed out in Gillespie v. People? 16 And,
finally, is it not legislation of the type which will encourage the danger
pointed out by the following prophetic dicta in the case of State v.
Kreutzberg: 17
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, op. cit. supra note 4.
15 George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 79 Atl. 262 (N. J.

14

1911).

16 Op. cit. supra note 2.
17 90 N. W. 1098, 1102, 1103 (Wis. 1902).

